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ABSTRACT: While it is a stylized fact that exporting firms pay higher wages than non-
exporting firms, the direction of the link between exporting and wages is less clear. 
Using a rich set of German linked employer-employee panel data we follow over 
time plants that start to export. We show that the exporter wage premium does 
already exist in the years before firms start to export, and that it does not increase 
in the following years. Higher wages in exporting firms are thus due to self-selection 




ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Während es als stilisiertes Faktum gilt, dass exportierende 
Firmen höhere Löhne zahlen als nicht exportierende, ist die Richtung des Zusam-
menhangs zwischen Exportieren und Löhnen weniger klar. Unter Verwendung 
eines großen verbundenen Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Datensatzes für Deutschland 
verfolgen wir Betriebe, die anfangen zu exportieren, über die Zeit. Wir zeigen, dass 
der Exportlohnaufschlag bereits in den Jahren vor Aufnahme der Exporttätigkeit 
besteht und dass er in den Jahren danach nicht zunimmt. Höhere Löhne in 
exportierenden Firmen sind somit das Ergebnis einer Selbstselektion von produk-
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    Exporting firms pay higher wages than firms that serve the national market 
only. This is one of the stylized facts from the emerging literature on the micro-
econometrics of international firm activities. It was pointed out by Bernard and 
Jensen (1995) in their pioneering Brookings Paper, and it has been confirmed in a 
large number of studies (surveyed in Schank, Schnabel and Wagner, 2007) with 
firm level data from many different countries. Some recent studies using linked 
employer-employee data have demonstrated that this positive link between export 
activities and the level of wages paid by a firm can even be found after controlling 
for observed and unobserved characteristics of both the employer and the 
employees.
1 
An issue that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been investigated 
empirically with linked employer-employee data is the sequencing behind the 
correlation of export activities and higher wages at the firm level. Does exporting 
lead to a wage premium? Or did exporting firms pay a wage premium even before 
they started to export? Theoretical considerations point to possible links in both 
directions that are by no means mutually exclusive: 
-  Hypothesis 1 (H1):  The observed exporter wage premium reflects self-
selection of more productive firms with higher wages into export markets. The 
recent literature on exporting by heterogeneous firms, pioneered by Melitz (2003) 
and surveyed by Greeneway and Kneller (2007), argues that only the more 
productive firms in an industry can bear the extra costs of entering foreign markets. 
In these models, exporters are more productive than non-exporters, and we 
observe self-selection of more productive firms into export activities, with the ex-
ante more productive firms becoming exporters. If wages are higher in more 
productive firms – due to higher profits and rent-sharing, or because higher 
(efficiency) wages cause higher productivity (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1986)
2 – and if 
                                            
1 See Munch and Skaksen (2006) for Denmark, Alcalá and Hernández (2007) for Spain, and 
Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) for Germany. Note, however, that Breau and Rigby (2006) 
find no wage difference between exporting and non-exporting plants after controlling for worker 
characteristics for the Los Angeles Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
2 Egger and Kreikemeier (2007) develop a model that incorporates workers’ fair wage preferences 
into a general equilibrium framework à la Melitz (2003). They modify the original Akerlof and Yellen 
(1990) fair wage – effort mechanism by introducing a rent-sharing motive as a determinant of 
workers’ fair wage preferences, assuming that the wage considered to be fair depends, among 
others, on the productivity level and thus on the performance of the firm. Identical workers then 
earn different wages in equilibrium, and higher wages are paid to employees working in more pro-
ductive firms. They refer to Fehr and Gächter (2000) who point out that the idea of gift exchange 
which is central to the fair wage – effort hypothesis implies exactly this. The theory of a positive 
correlation between productivity levels, profits and wages is well in line with empirical findings on 
rent-sharing in firms, as pointed out by Egger and Kreikemeier (2007). A different approach of 
introducing efficiency wages into heterogeneous firms models of the Melitz (2003) type is followed 
by Davis and Harrigan (2007) who argue that heterogeneity in the ability of firms to monitor effort 
leads to different wages for identical workers in equilibrium, following the variant of the efficiency 3 
 
more productive firms self-select into export markets, we expect that these future 
exporters already paid a wage premium to the workers ex-ante, i.e. before they 
started to export. 
- Hypothesis 2 (H2): Exporting makes firms more productive and leads to 
higher wages. This hypothesis found in the literature on exports and productivity 
points to the role of learning-by-exporting (see Bernard and Jensen, 1999, and 
Bernard and Wagner, 1997). Knowledge flows from international buyers and 
competitors help to improve the post-entry performance of export starters. 
Furthermore, firms participating in international markets are exposed to more 
intense competition and must improve faster than firms which only sell their 
products domestically. Exporting thus makes firms more productive. If wages are 
higher in more productive firms due to higher profits and rent-sharing, we may 
expect that exporting leads to higher wages. More specifically, this hypothesis 
predicts that after a firm has started to export, the wages of its employees increase 
stronger than the wages of employees who work in firms that continue to produce 
for the national market only, leading to an ex-post exporter wage premium. 
There is ample empirical evidence on the relationship between productivity 
and exporting, showing substantial exporter productivity premia and many findings 
in favor of the self-selection hypothesis, but much fewer results in favor of the 
learning-by-exporting hypothesis.
3 What is missing, however, are convincing 
empirical studies on the sequencing and the direction of the link between exporting 
and wages. One reason for this gap in the literature is the lack of suitable data. 
Since empirical studies of exporter wage differentials must control for observed and 
unobserved characteristics of both employers and employees that might determine 
wages besides exporting, they have to use linked employer-employee (LEE) panel 
data. To investigate the relevance of both the self-selection hypothesis and the 
learning-by-exporting hypothesis in explaining exporter wage differentials, LEE data 
are needed which cover a period that is long enough to follow cohorts of firms over 
a couple of years before and after they start to export, and which can be used to 
test for ex-ante and ex-post wage differentials. Apparently, such LEE data were not 
available until recently. 
Using suitable LEE data for Germany, a leading actor on the world market for 
goods,  this paper contributes to the literature by testing the two hypotheses 
mentioned above on the direction of the link between exporting and wages. For the 
period 1994 to 2005, we show that the exporter wage premium does already exist 
                                                                                                                                      
wage theory put forward by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). If export starters are larger than non-
exporters in the years before the start, and if monitoring costs are systematically higher in larger 
firms, this might lead to ex-ante wage differentials for identical workers in future export starters and 
non-exporters. 
3 See Wagner (2007) for a survey, and The International Study Group on Exports and Productivity 
(2007) for recent comparable results for 14 countries. 4 
 
in the years before firms start to export, and that it does not increase in the years 
after exporting started. According to our findings, higher wages in exporting firms 
are due to self-selection of more productive, better paying firms into export markets, 
but they are not caused by export activities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the LEE 
data. Section 3 presents the results of our empirical investigation, and section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. THE GERMAN LINKED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE DATA 
    The dataset used in the subsequent empirical analyses is the German LIAB, 
i.e. the linked employer-employee dataset of the Institute for Employment Research 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung,  IAB). The LIAB combines the 
Employment Statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit) with plant-level data from the IAB Establishment Panel. For detailed 
information on the LIAB, see Alda, Bender and Gartner (2005). 
The employee side of our dataset is the Employment Statistics, covering all 
employees and trainees subject to social security. They exclude, among others, the 
self-employed, family workers, a subgroup of civil servants (“Beamte”), students 
enrolled in higher education, and those in marginal employment. The employment 
statistics cover nearly 80 percent of all employed persons in western Germany and 
about 85 percent of employees in eastern Germany. They are collected by the 
social insurance institutions for their purposes according to a procedure introduced 
in 1973 and are made available to the Federal Employment Agency. Notifications 
are prescribed at the beginning and at the end of a person’s employment in a plant. 
In addition, an annual report for each employee is compulsory at the end of a year. 
Misreporting is legally sanctioned. The employment statistics contain information on 
an employee's occupation, the occupational status, and gross earnings up to the 
contribution assessment ceiling,
4 as well as on individual characteristics like sex, 
age, nationality, marital status, and qualification. Each personnel record also 
contains the establishment identifier, the industry, and the size of the plant. 
The employer side of our dataset is given by the IAB Establishment Panel, a 
random sample of establishments that is drawn from a stratified sample of the 
plants included in the Employment Statistics, where the strata are defined over 
industries and plant sizes (large plants are oversampled). In 1993, the panel started 
                                            
4 For daily gross wages, the ceiling in 2000, for example, is at € 143.92 for western and at € 118.81 
for eastern Germany. In our regression sample, 8.2 (4.3) percent of the wage observations in 
western (eastern) Germany are censored. In order to cope with a potential bias due to censoring, 
we also conducted analyses not reported here (but available on request) which show that 
restricting the sample to uncensored observations does not change our conclusions. 5 
 
with 4,265 plants, covering 0.27 percent of all plants in western Germany (2 million) 
and 11 percent of total employment (29 million). In 1996, the establishment panel 
also started in eastern Germany with 4,313 establishments representing 1.1 
percent of all plants (391,000) and 11 percent of total employment (6 million). The 
IAB Establishment Panel has been set up for the needs of the Federal Employment 
Agency to provide further information about the demand side of the labor market. 
Therefore, detailed information on the composition of the workforce and its 
development through time constitutes a major part of the questionnaire. Further 
questions include information on training and further education, wages, working 
time, business activities, establishment policies, and general information about the 
plant. 
The LIAB is created by linking the Employment Statistics and the IAB 
Establishment Panel through a plant identifier which is available in both data sets.
5 
Because the Employment Statistics is spell-based (one record for each employment 
spell), the combined data is potentially complex. To simplify, we select all (full-time) 
workers in the employment statistics who are employed by the surveyed plants on 
June 30th in a year. This yields an unbalanced annual panel of workers together 
with detailed information on the plants in which they work, which is unique for 
Germany. We are able to use the years 1994 to 2005, and we focus on the private 
sector (excluding agriculture). 
 
3. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
  The core of our empirical strategy to test for the validity of the two 
hypotheses on export activities and higher wages consists in comparing over time 
wages in plants that start to export with wages in plants that continue to produce for 
the national market only. We start at a point in time when both groups of plants did 
not export, and end at a point in time when some of these firms have exported for a 
while. Using observation periods of six years, we define export starters as plants 
that do not export in the first three years (t = 1, 2, 3), but start to export in year t = 4 
and continue to export in the years t = 5 and t = 6; non-exporters are plants that do 
not export in any of the years t = 1, …, 6. 
 
                                            
5 The LIAB data are confidential but not exclusive. They are available for non-commercial research 
by visiting the research data center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the IAB in 
Nuremberg, Germany. Researchers interested in replications or extensions of our work may 
contact the first author (e-mail: thorsten.schank@wiso.uni-erlangen.de) for a copy of the Stata do-
files used to produce the results reported here. 6 
 
3.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Using  the  LIAB  data  described in Section 2 above, the six-year-windows 
considered here are 1994 to 1999, 1995 to 2000, …, 2000 to 2005. Data for export 
starters and non-exporters were pooled over these seven cohorts, and wages and 
sales were deflated. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for both groups of plants 
and each year t = 1, …, 6. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
The sample available for our empirical investigation consists of 57 export 
starters and 3,139 non-exporters. A comparison of plants from both groups with 
regard to size (number of employees), labor productivity (sales per employee) and 
wages paid (average daily wage) reveals that export starters are on average larger, 
more productive, and better paying in each year. Compared to non-exporters, 
export starters have on average about three times the number of employees, and 
pay wages that are about 30 percent higher. However, while the difference in 
wages, which is the main focus of this study, is statistically highly significant, the 
difference in size is only marginally significant, and the difference in productivity is 
insignificant. 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 are in line with the first 
hypothesis (H1) according to which higher wages in exporting firms are due to self-
selection of more productive and better paying firms into export markets – labor 
productivity and daily wages are higher in future export starters compared to non-
exporters even in the years before the start (although the difference in average 
productivity is not statistically significant at any conventional level). In contrast, we 
find no evidence to support the second hypothesis (H2) which argues that exporting 
increases productivity and thus wages due to learning-by-exporting. Changes in 
labor productivity and in the daily wage between t = 3 and t = 6 do not differ in a 
statistically significant way between export starters and non-exporters. 
3.2  PLANT LEVEL REGRESSIONS 
    While providing interesting information, the descriptive statistics reported in 
Table 1 cannot be considered as a basis for a convincing test of the two 
hypotheses H1 and H2. Since an exporter wage premium is a positive difference 
between the wages paid to employees in exporting and non-exporting firms after 
controlling for differences in other variables than exporting that determine wages, 
the rest of the empirical investigation is concerned with controlling for these 
influences on wages. 7 
 
As a first step, we look at the difference in the plant average of daily wages 
between export starters and non-exporters over time, controlling for plant 
characteristics that can be expected to be related to the average wage level of a 
plant (including plant size, the presence or not of a works council, the use of new 
production technology, location in western or eastern Germany, various measures 
for the average qualification of the workforce, and dummies for industries, regions, 
and years). Results based on data for 3,196 plants are reported in column 1 of 
Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
The coefficient of the exporter-starter dummy variable (see row 1 of Table 2) 
shows that the average daily wage paid by export starters is 7 percent higher than 
in a comparable non-exporting plant in t = 1, i.e. three years before the export 
starts. This difference is both statistically significant and of a relevant order of 
magnitude from an economic point of view.
6 Results reported in column 3 of Table 2 
show that the same holds for labor productivity. Controlling for all plant 
characteristics used in the wage regression, the estimated productivity premium for 
export starters three years before the start is 19.8 percent. The statistically 
insignificant coefficients of the interaction terms of the export starter dummy 
variable and the dummy variables for t = 2 to t = 6 show that neither the difference 
in the average wage nor the difference in the average productivity changes over the 
years t=2 to t=6. 
These results are in line with our hypothesis H1 – plants with higher wages 
(and a higher productivity) self-select into export markets. Contrary to this, 
hypothesis H2 – that wages (and productivity) increase after starting to export due 
to learning-by-exporting effects – is not supported. Although in the wage regression 
and in the productivity regression five out of six point estimates of the interaction 
terms of the export starter dummy variable and the dummy variables for t = 4 to t = 
6 are positive, none of them is statistically significantly different from zero at a usual 
error level. These findings are fully in line with the results from the descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 1. 
Next, we apply an alternative approach to test for wage (and productivity) 
enhancing effects of starting to export. This is motivated by the problem that faster 
wage growth of plants which have just entered the export market (compared to 
plants that keep selling their products on the domestic market only) would not 
necessarily reflect a causal effect of exporting on wages. It could well be the case 
                                            
6 The control variables all have the expected signs, and most of them are statistically significant. 
Since the focus of this paper is on the exporter wage premium, we do not comment on the results 
for the control variables here and in other regressions. 8 
 
that better paying (and more productive) firms self-select into the export-starting 
group, but would have experienced higher wage growth even without starting to 
export. However, we cannot observe the latter scenario (i.e. the wage 
developments of today’s export starters if they had not started to export), which is 
the well-known problem of the missing counterfactual situation.
7 
This closely resembles a situation familiar from the evaluation of active labor 
market programs (or any other form of treatment of units): If participants, or treated 
units, are not selected randomly from a population but are selected or self-select 
according to certain criteria, the effect of a treatment cannot be evaluated by 
comparing the average performance of the treated and the non-treated. Since each 
unit (plant or person) either did participate or not, we lack the required information 
about its performance in the counterfactual situation. A way out is to construct a 
control group in such a way that every treated unit is matched to an untreated unit 
that was as similar as possible (ideally, identical) at the time before the treatment. 
Differences between the two groups (the treated, and the matched non-treated) 
after the treatment can then be attributed to the treatment (for a comprehensive 
discussion, see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). The use of a matching 
approach to search for effects of starting to export on wages (and other dimensions 
of firm performance, including productivity) has been pioneered by Wagner (2002), 
and it has been used in a growing number of empirical studies (surveyed in 
Wagner, 2007) ever since. 
In the present study, export starters in year t=4 were matched with “statistical 
twins” from the large group of non-exporters, based on characteristics of the plants 
in t = 1 (three years before the starters begin to export). Matching was implemented 
by nearest neighbour propensity score matching.
8 The propensity score was 
estimated from a probit regression of a dummy variable indicating whether or not a 
plant is an export starter in year t=4 on a set of variables (all measured at t = 1) that 
are considered as determinants of the probability to start to export and are related 
to the average wage paid in the firm. Details are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The balancing property (which requires an absence of statistically significant 
differences between the treatment group and the control group in the covariates 
after matching) is satisfied. The differences in the means of the variables used to 
compute the propensity score were never statistically significant between the 
starters and the matched non-starters (see Table A2 in the Appendix). The common 
support condition (which requires that the propensity score of a treated observation 
                                            
7 Although the regression results discussed above do not show a difference in wage growth 
between export starters and non-starters, these estimates may be biased due to the self-selection 
of export starters. 
8  Alternative matching procedures have also been carried out (using three and five nearest 
neighbors, kernel matching), but the (unreported) results were similar to those discussed in the 
next section. 9 
 
is neither higher than the maximum nor less than the minimum propensity score of 
the controls) was imposed by dropping export starters whose propensity score is 
higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the non-
exporters. 
This matching approach leads to 48 (out of 57) export starters for which a 
non-exporting twin-plant could be found. These 48 pairs constitute our so-called 
matched sample made up of 96 plants. The plant-level regressions of average daily 
wages and of sales per employee discussed above were repeated for data from this 
matched sample; results are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2. By 
construction (due to the successful matching) neither wages nor productivity differ 
significantly between export starters and non-exporting plants in t = 1, and the 
same holds for the other years before the export start in t = 4. 
In the matched sample, the estimated regression coefficients of the 
interaction terms of the export starter dummy variable with the dummy variables for 
the years t = 4, t = 5 and t = 6 turn out to be statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level in both the wage and the productivity regression. Therefore, in 
line with the findings from the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 and from the 
regressions using the full sample of plants reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2, 
we find no evidence for hypothesis H2 which argues that exporting increases 
productivity and thus wages due to learning-by-exporting. 
3.3  INDIVIDUAL LEVEL WAGE REGRESSIONS 
    The plant level estimations presented in Section 3.2 may suffer from 
aggregation bias since individual heterogeneity which influences wages cannot be 
controlled for. Therefore, we replicate the empirical investigation for wages using 
data at the individual level, controlling for both observed employer and employee 
characteristics.
9 Like in the plant level analysis we consider two samples of plants – 
the full sample of all plants, and the matched sample made up of export starters 
and matched non-exporters.  
We also take into account that the selection effect only controls for time-
invariant differences between export starters and non-starters and their employees. 
Any changes in the workforce (due to hirings and separations) are by definition not 
absorbed by the selection effect. If quitters and joiners are non-random with respect 
to the introduction of the export activity, we may obtain a biased estimate of our 
hypothesis  H2. We control for this by (additionally) looking only at wages of 
individuals who remain in the respective plant in all six years observed (stayers). 
 
                                            
9 Due to the lack of information for productivity at the individual level this replication is possible for 
the wage equations only. 10 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
Results for the full sample of 3,196 plants and all 351,157 employees, 
meaning a total of 1,270,089 observations, are reported in column 1 of Table 3. The 
estimated coefficient of the export starter dummy variable is positive and highly 
statistically significant. It is also large from an economic point of view, pointing to an 
export starter wage differential of 9 percent in t = 1 (i.e. three years before the 
start). Although this differential reduces slightly in t = 2, these results are strongly in 
favor of hypothesis H1 according to which higher wages in exporting firms are due 
to self-selection of better paying firms into export markets. This finding is 
corroborated by the results for the same empirical model estimated for stayers only 
(see column 2 of Table 3), where an export starter wage premium of 7.7 percent is 
found.
10 
In contrast, hypothesis H2 (according to which wages and productivity 
increase after starting to export due to learning-by-exporting effects) is not 
supported by our data. Neither in the estimations based on all employees nor in the 
regressions including stayers only the interaction terms of the export starter dummy 
variable and the dummy variables for the years t = 4, t = 5 and t = 6 are ever 
positive and statistically significant. In fact, five of the six coefficients are negative, 
and wages do even decrease in the year of the export start compared to wages 
earned by employees with the same characteristics in plants with the same 
characteristics which continue to produce for the national market only. 
Finally, we turn to the results for all employees and for the stayers in the 
matched sample. These are reported in columns 3 and 4, respectively, of Table 3. 
Again, we do not find any empirical evidence in favor of a wage increase after 
starting to export. Higher wages in exporting plants thus do not seem to be induced 
by export activities. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
    Using a rich set of German linked employer-employee panel data, we have 
demonstrated that the exporter wage premium does already exist in the years 
before plants start to export, and that it does not increase in the years after 
exporting started. According to our results, higher wages in exporting plants that are 
found after controlling for observed and unobserved employer and employee 
characteristics are due to self-selection of more productive, better paying plants into 
export markets. This empirical finding is in accordance with the recent theoretical 
                                            
10 As before, the control variables all have the expected signs, and most of them are statistically 
significant. 11 
 
literature on exporting by heterogeneous firms (pioneered by Melitz 2003) which 
postulates that only the more productive firms in an industry can bear the extra 
costs of entering foreign markets. 
Our empirical results imply that the so-called exporter wage premium is 
labeled misleadingly since it may not be caused by export activities. At least in the 
case of Germany, one of the major exporting countries in the world, exporting does 
not seem to make firms more productive and lead to higher wages. It would be 
interesting to see whether this finding can be replicated for other countries using 
linked employer-employee panel data. These sort of data provide information that 
should be tapped more intensively in order to gain additional insights in 
international firm activities. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for export starters and non-exporters, all plants  




Prob-value for H0: 
Diff. of means = 0 
  Mean Mean  
Plant size 
(number of persons) 
 
t = 1  319.32 109.27 0.07 
t = 2  312.35 104.68 0.06 
t = 3  289.19 101.84 0.07 
t = 4  289.04  99.66 0.06 
t = 5  288.68 97.65 0.05 
t = 6  270.90 95.05 0.06 
      
Yearly sales per employee 
(in thousands of €)       
t = 1  140.69 120.87 0.25 
t = 2  146.47 121.72 0.29 
t = 3  146.25 119.16 0.19 
t = 4  134.94 121.33 0.36 
t = 5  127.32 122.38 0.76 
t = 6  150.75 125.98 0.36 
      
Average daily wage (in €)       
t = 1  77.75 60.32 0.00 
t = 2  77.86 60.34 0.00 
t = 3  79.81 61.12 0.00 
t = 4  79.98 61.46 0.00 
t = 5  79.81 61.22 0.00 
t = 6  79.96 60.62 0.00 
   
Growth rates between 
t = 3 and t = 6, in % 
 
   
   Plant size  
   (number of persons) 
 
27.42 -0.65 0.22 
   Yearly sales per   
   employee  
   (in thousands of €) 
1.40 8.58 0.27 
   
   Average daily wage 
   (in €) 
-0.01 -0.24 0.85 
Sample is lower for sales per employee due to missing values. Export starters are plants 
which do not export in the first three years (t = 1, 2, 3), but export in the last three years (t = 
4, 5, 6). Non-exporters do not export in any year. Wages and sales are deflated by the 
aggregate consumer price index. t = 1,… , 6 refers to a specific year in the 6-year-window a 
plant is observed. Start (end) years for these windows vary across plants between 1994 
(1999) and 2000 (2005). 14 
 
Table 2: Plant-level regressions of wages and labor productivity (OLS); Germany 
Dependent variable:  Logarithm of (plant 
average of) daily wage 
Logarithm of sales per 
employee 
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   Workers with apprenticeship 










   Workers with technical college   
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   Workers with unreported   

























      
Observations  18,800 576  16,723 542 
Plants  3,196 96  3,077 96 
R
2  0.650 0.889 0.453 0.739 
Regressions also include 36 sectoral dummies, 9 urbanisation dummies, 15 regional dum-
mies, 11 year dummies as well as 5 dummies for the respective periods t. |t|-statistics in 
parentheses, based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the plant-level. Full 
sample refers to all observations with no missing values in the covariates. Matched sample 
refers to observations from plants which have been selected via nearest neighbor propen-




Table 3: Individual level wage regressions (OLS); Germany 
   (Dependent variable: logarithm of daily wage) 
  Full sample  Matched sample 
Explanatory  variables  All Stayers  All Stayers 
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Technical college degree 





























Master craftsman, foreman 



















    
Observations 1,270,089  709,536  124,062  78,420 
Employees 351,157  118,256  30,588  13,070 
Plants 3,196  2,745  96  96 
R
2  0.622 0.600 0.681 0.696 
Regressions also include 36 sectoral dummies, 9 urbanisation dummies, 15 regional dum-
mies, 11 year dummies as well as 5 dummies for the respective periods t. |t|-statistics in 
parentheses, based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the plant-level. Full 
sample refers to all observations with no missing values in the covariates. Matched sample 
refers to observations of employees from plants which have been selected via nearest 
neighbor propensity score matching, where the propensity score has been obtained from a 
probit on export-starting. All comprise stayers (workers which work for the respective plant 
in all six years of the data window) as well as employees which join/leave the plant during 




Table A1: Determinants of export-starting, probit estimation; Germany  
     (Dependent variable is a dummy for export starters: 1 = yes) 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient   Z-value 
Logarithm of average wage  1.363   [2.77]*** 
Logarithm of total sales per employee  0.093   [0.67] 
Logarithm of establishment size 
(number of employees) 
0.952  [3.24]*** 
Squared logarithm of establishment 
size 
-0.067  [2.17]** 
Works council (dummy: 1= yes)  0.173   [0.73] 
Collective agreement (reference: no 
collective agreement) 
  
   at sectoral level (dummy: 1= yes)  -0.422   [1.92]* 
   at firm level (dummy: 1= yes)  0.129   [0.49] 
Plant belongs to a larger unit 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
-0.118  [0.51] 
New production technology  
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.083  [0.42] 
Eastern Germany (dummy: 1= yes)  0.744   [2.53]** 
Average age of employees (in years)  -0.275   [1.39] 
Average age squared
 (divided by 100)  0.322   [1.28] 
Average tenure of employees   0.053   [0.60] 
Average tenure squared (divided by 
100) 
-0.452  [0.77] 
Proportion within total workforce of 
plant: 
  
   Female workers  0.545   [1.22] 
   Workers with  
   apprenticeship, no Abitur  
-0.434  [1.26] 
   Workers without 
   apprenticeship, with Abitur  
3.935  [0.72] 
   Workers with 
   apprenticeship and Abitur  
0.18  [0.17] 
   Workers with technical 
   college degree  
-0.14  [0.14] 
   Workers with university  
   degree 
0.026  [0.03] 
   Master craftsman     0.483   [0.25] 
   Constant  -10.453   [.] 
  
Number of plants  2,182  
X
2(48) 164.65   *** 
Pseudo-R
2 0.346  
All covariates dated at t=1. Regressions also include sectoral and year dummies. */**/*** 
denotes statistical significance at the 10/5/1 % level. Number of plants is lower than the 
respective figure reported in Tables 2/3 (3,196), since the latter also comprise plants which 
have missing values in the first year (and thus do not enter the probit regression), but with 
complete information in at least one of the other years. 19 
 
Table A2: Mean values of variables for export starters and non-exporters 















(N = 48) 
Non-
exporters
(N = 48) 
P-value
a 
Logarithm of average wage  4.317 4.042 0.00 4.287  4.352 0.27
Logarithm of total sales per 
employee 
12.294 11.837 0.00 12.315 12.338 0.89
Establishment size (number 
of employees) 
4.405 3.068 0.00 4.428 4.590 0.62
Works council 
(dummy: 1= yes) 
0.554 0.234 0.00 0.542 0.563 0.84
Collective agreement at the 
sectoral level  
(dummy: 1= yes) 
0.500 0.504 0.95 0.479 0.625 0.15
Collective agreement at the 
firm level  (dummy: 1= yes) 
0.143 0.106 0.44 0.167 0.167 1.00
Plant belongs to a larger unit 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.232 0.124 0.06 0.208 0.208 1.00
New production technology  
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.768 0.704 0.27 0.771 0.792 0.81
Eastern Germany (dummy: 
1= yes) 
0.446 0.504 0.40 0.479 0.417 0.54
Average age of employees 
(in years) 
39.933 38.589 0.04 39.793 39.935 0.86
Average Tenure of 
employees  
16.160 15.246 0.08 16.005 16.092 0.89
Proportion within total 
workforce of plant: 
         
   Female workers  0.264 0.375 0.00 0.275  0.251 0.59
   Workers with  
   apprenticeship, no Abitur  
0.007 0.003 0.18 0.005 0.007 0.56
   Workers without 
   apprenticeship, with Abitur  
0.032 0.024 0.33 0.036 0.035 0.95
   Workers with   
   apprenticeship and Abitur  
0.050 0.024 0.04 0.043 0.064 0.39
   Workers with technical 
   college degree  
0.062 0.027 0.10 0.045 0.048 0.88
   Workers with university   
   degree 
0.021 0.023 0.78 0.024 0.031 0.51
   Master craftsman     0.264 0.375 0.00 0.275  0.251 0.59
a  Two-sample t-test (with unequal variance) of the hypothesis that the difference in the 
mean is equal to zero. 
b  Information refers to the first year a plant is observed (t = 1), i.e. three years before 
the (potential) export-start. Sample may be lower for some variables due to missing 
values. 
c  Numbers differ slightly from those reported in Table 1 (57 resp. 3,139) since the latter 
also include plants which have missing values in covariates in t=1. 
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